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INTRODUCTION 
Research on judgment and d e c i s i o n making has produced two 
c l a s s e s o f t h e o r i e s , i . e., d e s c r i p t i v e t h e o r i e s which s p e c i f y 
how humans a c t u a l l y make d e c i s i o n s , on the one hand, and 
p r e s c r i p t i v e t h e o r i e s on the other hand. P r e s c r i p t i v e t h e o r i e s 
are formal procedures which one supposedly ought t o apply t o 
determine the b e s t d e c i s i o n under some w e l l d e f i n e d c o n d i t i o n s . 
Such c o n d i t i o n s are u s u a l l y s p e c i f i e d by a r e l a t i v e l y s m all 
number of f a c t s or v a r i a b l e s . P r e s c r i p t i v e r u l e s are based upon 
r a t i o n a l i t y p r i n c i p l e s such as c o n s i s t e n c y , t r a n s i t i v i t y of 
ch o i c e s , or the maximization of s u b j e c t i v e u t i l i t y (Edwards, 
1984). 
For example, a d e c i s i o n task may be c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a s e t 
of a l t e r n a t i v e a c t i o n s or a l t e r n a t i v e s , which we s h a l l r e p r e s e n t 
by the s e t {..x, y, z..}. Furthermore, i t i s assumed t h a t every 
a l t e r n a t i v e x i s d e s c r i b e d by i t s f e a t u r e s x^ on some n 
a t t r i b u t e s o r dimensions, which are co n s i d e r e d r e l e v a n t . 
Presumably some s u b j e c t i v e ( u t i l i t y ) v a l u e v ( X j L ) can be assigned 
t o every f e a t u r e x^ of every a l t e r n a t i v e x on each dimension i . 
Each dimension i i s furthermore g i v e n some importance weight 
w ( i ) . The p a r t i c u l a r a l t e r n a t i v e s , the r e l e v a n t dimensions, the 
importance weights as w e l l as the v a l u e s v(x^) may a l l be 
s u b j e c t i v e l y s p e c i f i e d by an i n d i v i d u a l . The m u l t i - a t t r i b u t e 
u t i l i t y (MAU) p r i n c i p l e (Keeney, 1982) would then p r e s c r i b e to 
maximize the s u b j e c t i v e u t i l i t y by s e l e c t i n g an a l t e r n a t i v e f o r 
which 
n n 
2 w(i) * v(x^) > £ w(i) * v(y^) f o r a l l a l t e r n a t i v e s 
i = l i = l 
y e {..x, y, z..}. 
Many years o f r e s e a r c h have shown t h a t such p r e s c r i p t i v e 
models do not adequately d e s c r i b e the c o g n i t i v e d e c i s i o n process 
of humans i n ge n e r a l nor of human experts i n p a r t i c u l a r ( S l o v i c , 
F i s c h h o f f , & L i c h t e n s t e i n , 1977). Instead, the e m p i r i c a l 
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r e s e a r c h o f human i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g y i e l d e d the 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n of d e s c r i p t i v e t h e o r i e s of d e c i s i o n making. T h i s 
r e s e a r c h shows t h a t c o n t r a r y t o p r e s c r i p t i v e models humans use 
h e u r i s t i c s i n d e c i s i o n making which y i e l d v i o l a t i o n s of 
r a t i o n a l i t y p r i n c i p l e s and r e s u l t i n a number o f b i a s e s 
(Hahnemann & Tversky, 1972). Supposedly, such h e u r i s t i c s are 
employed r a t h e r than p r e s c r i p t i v e procedures because o f 
p r o c e s s i n g l i m i t a t i o n s of the human mind. Let us c o n s i d e r , f o r 
example, the p r o c e s s i n g e f f o r t r e q u i r e d t o apply the m u l t i -
a t t r i b u t e u t i l i t y r u l e i n a simple b i n a r y c h o i c e s i t u a t i o n , i n 
comparison t o some s e l e c t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g r u l e . 
EFFORT-QUALITY RELATIONS FOR COMPLETE AND SELECTIVE INFORMATION 
PROCESSING 
S p e c i f i c a t i o n o f b i n a r y c h o i c e t a s k : Assume t h a t the 
a l t e r n a t i v e s x and y are d e s c r i b e d by n dimensions. With respect 
t o these n dimensions every a l t e r n a t i v e i s d e s c r i b e d by the 
r e s p e c t i v e n f e a t u r e s , x = ( x l f . . . x^,... x n) and y = ( y 1 # . . 
y^,... y n ) . The a t t r a c t i v e n e s s of every f e a t u r e s h a l l be 
s p e c i f i e d by a p o s i t i v e i n t e g e r v e [a, b ] . With r : = b - a, a 
d e c i s i o n maker d i s t i n g u i s h e s r + 1 d i f f e r e n t a t t r a c t i v e n e s s 
v a l u e s . 
For reason of s i m p l i c i t y i t i s assumed w(i) = 1 f o r a l l 
a t t r i b u t e s i . Without l o s s of g e n e r a l i t y i t may furthermore be 
assumed t h a t by the MAU-rule 
For such b i n a r y c h o i c e s the e f f o r t and q u a l i t y of a d e c i s i o n 
can be d e f i n e d i n a r a t h e r simple way. 
D e f i n i t i o n . I f the MAU-rule determines x y y, then the 
q u a l i t y Q of a d e c i s i o n procedure p w i t h r e s p e c t t o the c h o i c e 
p a i r (x,y) s h a l l be g i v e n by 
n n 
x y & E v f x ^ > 
i = l i = l 
2 v ( Y i ) . 
0 i f p determines x ^ y, 
Q(P) = (1) 
1 i f p determines x y y. 
I f the MAU-rule determines x ^ y and x ^ y, then Q(p) = 1 
w i t h r e s p e c t t o the c h o i c e p a i r (x,y) f o r a l l d e c i s i o n procedures 
p. A c h o i c e which c o i n c i d e s with the choice of the MAU-rule w i l l 
be termed an optimal c h o i c e . I t i s p o s t u l a t e d t h a t the 
p r o c e s s i n g of every f e a t u r e r e q u i r e s a constant p r o c e s s i n g e f f o r t 
e. S i n c e i t i s assumed t h a t every f e a t u r e i s processed a t most 
once, the d e c i s i o n e f f o r t f o r the a p p l i c a t i o n of some procedure p 
i s : 
where I i s the number of d e c i s i o n c r i t e r i a c onsidered. Thus f o r 
the MAU-rule E = 2 * n * e. 
D e c i s i o n procedures with reduced p r o c e s s i n g e f f o r t . We w i l l 
c o n s i d e r two r u l e s f o r reducing d e c i s i o n e f f o r t . For both r u l e s 
i t i s assumed t h a t the d e c i s i o n c r i t e r i a are ordered with r e s p e c t 
to the g i v e n c h o i c e s i t u a t i o n , and the f e a t u r e s of the c h o i c e 
a l t e r n a t i v e s are processed i n the order of importance of the 
r e s p e c t i v e dimensions. 
An e f f o r t r e d u c t i o n may simply be achieved by p r o c e s s i n g 
fewer dimensions, i . e., a p p l y i n g the MAU-rule only f o r I < n 
c r i t e r i a . In other words, a d e c i s i o n maker would process only 
the I most important dimensions f o r d e r i v i n g a d e c i s i o n . Since a 
d e c i s i o n would thus depend upon the constant number of 
dimensions, which a d e c i s i o n maker has s p e c i f i e d f o r making a 
d e c i s i o n , t h i s procedure w i l l be termed dimension-dependent 
p r o c e s s i n g or DD-processing. While DD-processing may 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y reduce the d e c i s i o n e f f o r t , i t cannot guarantee 
t h a t the c h o i c e of the MAU-rule w i l l be obtained. 
Instead of p r o c e s s i n g some predetermined number of 
dimensions, d e c i s i o n e f f o r t c o u l d a l s o be reduced by a l l o w i n g the 
number of processed dimensions t o depend upon the p a r t i c u l a r 
c h o i c e p a i r . For example, only as many d e c i s i o n c r i t e r i a may be 
processed as are necessary f o r y i e l d i n g some predetermined 
o v e r a l l a t t r a c t i v e n e s s d i f f e r e n c e k between every two 
a l t e r n a t i v e s . A c h o i c e would thus depend upon some c r i t e r i o n k. 
T h e r e f o r e , t h i s d e c i s i o n procedure w i l l be termed c r i t e r i o n -
dependent p r o c e s s i n g , or CD-processing. For a g i v e n k and some 
ch o i c e p a i r (x, y ) , j k dimensions w i l l be processed, where 
E = 2 * I * e (2) 
J 
min { j : | £ v(xL) - v(yL) \ > k; j<n } 
i = l 
n e l s e . 
I t i s c l e a r t h a t s m a l l k v a l u e s reduce d e c i s i o n e f f o r t while 
l a r g e k v a l u e s ensure d e c i s i o n q u a l i t y . However, i t remains t o 
be examined whether some k reduces d e c i s i o n e f f o r t , w h i l e 
guaranteeing the q u a l i t y o f a d e c i s i o n as w e l l . In or d e r t o 
i n v e s t i g a t e t h i s i s s u e , we w i l l f i r s t examine the c o n d i t i o n s f o r 
which a c e r t a i n k may y i e l d a c h o i c e , which d i f f e r s from the 
c h o i c e o f the MAU-rule. Assume t h a t a l t e r n a t i v e s x and y can be 
ev a l u a t e d by n dimensions and t h a t the a t t r a c t i v e n e s s e v a l u a t i o n 
o f a f e a t u r e y i e l d s one o f r + 1 d i f f e r e n t a t t r a c t i v e n e s s v a l u e s . 
For example, v G [1,7]. Non-optimal c h o i c e s w i t h j p r o c e s s i n g 
s t e p s and a c r i t e r i o n v a l u e k, must s a t i s f y the f o l l o w i n g 
c o n d i t i o n s : In order t o produce a c h o i c e a t the b a r r i e r k 
j * r > k, (4) 
and f o r y i e l d i n g the o p t i m a l c h o i c e w i t h the MAU-rule i f 
p r o c e s s i n g were t o be cont i n u e d up t o the n-th dimension: 
(n-j) * r > k+l. (5) 
Th e r e f o r e , i f 
(n-j) * r < k+l (6) 
a b i n a r y c h o i c e must be i d e n t i c a l t o the c h o i c e o f the MAU r u l e , 
even when l e s s than n dimensions have been processed. In other 
words, i f the accumulated a t t r a c t i v e n e s s d i f f e r e n c e on r 
dimensions between x and y i s ve r y l a r g e , the d i r e c t i o n o f the 
d i f f e r e n c e cannot be changed by p r o c e s s i n g t he remaining 
dimensions. 
Theorem. For b a r r i e r s k > c = n/2 * r , the CD-processing 
r u l e guarantees c h o i c e s which c o i n c i d e w i t h the c h o i c e s of the 
MAU-rule, w h i l e up t o 50 pe r c e n t o f the d e c i s i o n e f f o r t may be 
saved. 
Proof. From Eq. (4) and (6), we o b t a i n j * r = (n-j) * r , 
and j = n/2. I n s e r t i n g i n t o Eq. (4) y i e l d s c = n/2 * r . Thus, 
f o r k > n/2 * r , the q u a l i t y of a c h o i c e i s guaranteed. 
For example, when n = 20, f o r the c h o i c e p a i r w i t h 
3k 
E v(XJL) - v(yjL) = n/2 * r and j k = n/2 (7) 
i = l 
a 50 p e r c e n t r e d u c t i o n o f p r o c e s s i n g e f f o r t w i l l be saved. For 
choi c e p a i r s which do not s a t i s f y Eq(7), but r a t h e r 
E v(x^) - v(y^) > n/2 * r and j k • n/2 + 1 (8) 
i = l 
a ((n/2-1)*100)/n) percent r e d u c t i o n of p r o c e s s i n g e f f o r t w i l l be 
achieved, and so on. F i n a l l y , f o r choice p a i r s w i t h j k « n-1, 
(100/n) percent p r o c e s s i n g e f f o r t w i l l be saved. 
For more r e a l i s t i c v e r s i o n s of the MAU-rule, where the 
a t t r a c t i v e n e s s d i f f e r e n c e s .of a dimension are weighted by the 
importance of t h a t dimension, p r o c e s s i n g e f f o r t may be reduced by 
an even l a r g e r amount. For example, c o n s i d e r CD-processing with 
the weighted MAU-rule: For a given k and a c h o i c e p a i r (x,y), j k 
dimensions w i l l be processed, where 
3k : = 
min { j : | E w(i) * ( v(x±) - v(y±) ) | > k ; j<n } 
n, 
i = l 
(9) 
e l s e . 
Furthermore, assume t h a t the importance weight of dimension 
i i s d e f i n e d by: 
w(l) = n; w(i+l) - w(i) - 1. (10) 
By t h i s p r o c e s s i n g r u l e optimal c h o i c e s are guaranteed by k-
v a l u e s which s a t i s f y the f o l l o w i n g r e s t r i c t i o n s : 
j 
E w(i) * r > k, (11) 




* r k + l , (12) 
We determine the lower boundary of the k-values, f o r which 
an optimal c h o i c e i s guaranteed by: 
j 
E w(i) * r 
i = l 
E w(i) * r 
i = j + l 
n 
By i n s e r t i o n of Eq. (10) : 
j * (n + n - j +1) * r (n - j ) * (n - j + 1) * r 
2 2 
which y i e l d s : 
j = 1/2 * (2n + 1 - 2n 2 + 2n + 1 . 
[ j ] 
For k > E w(i) * r , the r e s u l t i n g c h o i c e s n e c e s s a r i l y 
i = l 
c o i n c i d e w i t h the c h o i c e s obtained by the MAU-rule. For example 
wi t h n = 20, k > 105 * r guarantees an optimal c h o i c e . 
T h e r e f o r e w i t h n = 20, i n , t h e b e s t case o n l y 6 dimensions must be 
processed. 
Although the p o s s i b l e range of e f f o r t r e d u c t i o n was 
s p e c i f i e d by Theorem 1, the expected e f f o r t - r e d u c t i o n f o r a 
sample o f c h o i c e p a i r s depends upon the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the 
p a r t i c u l a r sample. In order t o i n s p e c t how much e f f o r t r e d u c t i o n 
may be achieved on an average, under the assumption t h a t the r + 
1 a t t r a c t i v e n e s s v a l u e s are u n i f o r m l y d i s t r i b u t e d between the 
two a l t e r n a t i v e s and among the n dimensions, we w i l l c a l c u l a t e 
the expected e f f o r t r e d u c t i o n f o r some examples. 
For i n s t a n c e , assume t h a t a person d i s t i n g u i s h e s o n l y 
between u n a t t r a c t i v e and a t t r a c t i v e f e a t u r e s . U n a t t r a c t i v e 
f e a t u r e s s h a l l r e c e i v e a v a l u e of 1 and a t t r a c t i v e f e a t u r e s s h a l l 
r e c e i v e a v a l u e of 2. Thus v e [1,2]. I f the (unweighted) MAU-
r u l e i s used and the a l t e r n a t i v e s are d e s c r i b e d by n=2 
dimensions, a k=l guarantees an optimal c h o i c e . 
For the 2 a t t r a c t i v e n e s s v a l u e s and the 2 dimensions, 16 
d i f f e r e n t c h o i c e p a i r s e x i s t . For 11 of these p a i r s , the MAU-
r u l e y i e l d s x ^ y. For 4 of these p a i r s CD-processing a c c o r d i n g 
t o Eq. (3) y i e l d s a c h o i c e with j k = 1. On the average, a 
p r o c e s s i n g r e d u c t i o n of 18 percent i s thus achieved i n the g i v e n 
example. S i m i l a r l y , f o r n = 3, k = 2 ensures an o p t i m a l c h o i c e 
and a p r o c e s s i n g r e d u c t i o n of 9.5 percent i s obtained. For n = 
4, k = 2 ensures the o p t i m a l c h o i c e , and p r o c e s s i n g e f f o r t i s 
reduced by 29 p e r c e n t on the average. In g e n e r a l , the number of 
choice p a i r s f o r which k = n/2 * r i s surpassed a f t e r j k e [n/2, 
n/2 + 1/ , n - 1, n] dimensions have been processed, may be 
s p e c i f i e d by l i n e a r diophantine equations (Bose & Manvel, 1984). 
Although a t l e a s t i n some cases a s u b s t a n t i a l e f f o r t r e d u c t i o n 
may be achieved w h i l e p r e s e r v i n g q u a l i t y , a d e c i s i o n maker may 
even l i k e t o f u r t h e r reduce d e c i s i o n e f f o r t . 
Reducing d e c i s i o n e f f o r t a t the c o s t of d e c i s i o n - q u a l i t y . 
D e c i s i o n e f f o r t may a d d i t i o n a l l y be reduced by f u r t h e r lowering 
the k-value. Thereby, the average d e c i s i o n q u a l i t y w i l l p o s s i b l y 
a l s o be decreased. A l s o , the DD-processing r u l e may be a p p l i e d 
f o r r e d u c i n g d e c i s i o n e f f o r t . The r e l a t i o n between k and the 
e f f o r t as w e l l as the q u a l i t y of a c h o i c e i s s p e c i f i e d by the 
f o l l o w i n g d e f i n i t i o n : 
D e f i n i t i o n . Assume t h a t f o r a c hoice p a i r (x, y ) , the MAU-
r u l e determines x > y. The d e c i s i o n e f f o r t E(k) of CD-processing 
with parameter k i s g i v e n by: 
k > E(k) : = 2 * j k * e 
The q u a l i t y Q(k) of the r e s p e c t i v e d e c i s i o n i s d e f i n e d by: 




Furthermore, we d e f i n e : 
E : = { E(k) ; k 
i f S v ^ ) 
i f £ v f x ^ 
i f j K = n. 
= 1 ...n) 
v ( y i ) < -k 




{ E(k) i S v f X i ) - v ( y i ) < -k; k = l,...,n) 
1=1 
= E \ E~, and 
= 1E+ ( E ( k ) ) , where 1 A ( a ) : = 
f 1 i f a E A 
0 i f a £ A 
For the DD-processing r u l e which assumes t h a t some f i x e d j < 
n dimensions are processed, q u a l i t y and e f f o r t depend upon j . 
Q(j) and E ( j ) s h a l l be d e f i n e d a c c o r d i n g l y . 
While the mapping k > E(k) i s monotonic f o r a l l p a i r s (x, 
y) , k > Q(k) may v i o l a t e m onotonicity. 
Proof; By d e f i n i t i o n k x < k 2 — > Efk-^) < E ( k 2 ) 
For v ( x x ) = 2, v ( x 2 ) - 1, v ( x 3 ) = 6, 
v ( y x ) = 1, v ( y 2 ) = 4, v ( y 3 ) = 1, and k = 1: 
Q ( l ) = 1, Q(2) = 0, and Q<3) - 1. 
D e f i n i t i o n ; Assume t h a t f o r (x, y) the MAU-rule determines 
x >• y. Then i t i s s a i d t h a t E + has a gap a t p o s i t i o n k i f t h e r e 
e x i s t s a 
k f> 0, k'< k: E(k') e E + and E(k) e E"; 
L:= { k | E(k) G E~, and t h e r e e x i s t s k'< k so t h a t 
E(k') G E +} 
I t i s assumed t h a t a d e c i s i o n maker a c q u i r e s i n f o r m a t i o n 
about the f e a t u r e s o f the a l t e r n a t i v e s , d u r i n g the c h o i c e when he 
i s p r o c e s s i n g these f e a t u r e s . S i n c e a d e c i s i o n maker does not 
have any p r i o r i n f o r m a t i o n about the p a r t i c u l a r a l t e r n a t i v e s 
between which he i s about t o choose, the average q u a l i t y and 
e f f o r t o f a sample of c h o i c e s p a i r s may be more important 
s t a t i s t i c s than the r e s p e c t i v e v a l u e s of a s i n g l e c h o i c e p a i r . 
For some sample S o f p a i r s (x, y ) , we d e f i n e the average e f f o r t 
and the average q u a l i t y as: 
E(k) E(k) 
1 
Q(E(k)) := S Q(k) , 
|S| s 
For a sample S the number I of gaps f o r some g i v e n k i s 
d e f i n e d by: 
S 
Lemma. 3(E ( k ) ) i s m o n o t o n i c a l l y i n c r e a s i n g i f f f o r k < k 1 : 
£(k») < £(k) . 
Conjecture. I f (r+l) v a l u e s are u n i f o r m l y d i s t r i b u t e d 
between the two a l t e r n a t i v e s and among the n dimensions i n some 
p o p u l a t i o n of c h o i c e p a i r s , the mapping E (k) > Q(E(k)) i s 
m o n o t o n i c a l l y i n c r e a s i n g . 
Evidence. As a f i r s t step a s i m u l a t i o n was performed. For 
n = 11/ v = [1,7], and CD-processing by Eq(3), the r e s u l t s are 
shown i n F i g u r e 1. For CD-processing accord i n g t o Eq. (9) and 
(10), the r e s p e c t i v e r e s u l t s are shown i n F i g u r e 2. 
E f f o r t - Q u a l i t y T r a d e - o f f . A d e c i s i o n maker may d e s i r e t o 
reduce d e c i s i o n e f f o r t a t the c o s t of d e c i s i o n q u a l i t y up t o the 
p o i n t where the b e n e f i t s of the e f f o r t r e d u c t i o n are s m a l l e r than 
the n e g a t i v e consequences (costs) of the r e s p e c t i v e q u a l i t y 
r e d u c t i o n . Whether an e f f o r t - r e d u c t i o n i s d e s i r a b l e a t a l l , thus 
depends upon the u t i l i t i e s which a d e c i s i o n maker a t t r i b u t e s t o 
the v a r i o u s e f f o r t and q u a l i t y l e v e l s as w e l l as upon the 
f u n c t i o n a l r e l a t i o n between e f f o r t and d e c i s i o n q u a l i t y . For the 
CD- and DD-processing r u l e s , the f u n c t i o n a l r e l a t i o n between the 
average e f f o r t and the average q u a l i t y of a d e c i s i o n may be 
c h a r a c t e r i z e d a c c o r d i n g t o the f o l l o w i n g d e f i n i t i o n . 
D e f i n i t i o n . The f u n c t i o n Q i s s a i d t o be n e g a t i v e l y 
( p o s i t i v e l y ) a c c e l e r a t e d a t the p o i n t of some b a r r i e r k, i f 
<3(E(k)) - 5 ( H ( k ) ) Q(m(k)) - Q(E(k)) 
> ~ ~ (13) 
E(k) - M(k) (<) m(k) - E(k) 
where M(k) = sup { E(£) 
I 
1(0 < E(k) } 
m(k) - i n f { E(£) E(k) < E(£) } , 
I 
E ( 0 ) : = 0; Q*(0) : » .5; and f o r ¥(k) = 2 * n * e 
the r i g h t s i d e o f Eq (13) i s d e f i n e d t o be zero. I f a f u n c t i o n Q 
i s n e g a t i v e l y ( p o s i t i v e l y ) a c c e l e r a t e d i n every s i n g l e p o i n t 
which i s s p e c i f i e d by a k-value, the f u n c t i o n i s s a i d t o be 
n e g a t i v e l y ( p o s i t i v e l y ) a c c e l e r a t e d . For the DD-processing r u l e 
n e g a t i v e l y and p o s i t i v e l y a c c e l e r a t e d i s d e f i n e d a c c o r d i n g l y f o r 
a l l v a l u e s 






C o n j e c t u r e . I f (r+l) v a l u e s are u n i f o r m l y d i s t r i b u t e d 
between two a l t e r n a t i v e s and the n dimensions, the CD-processing 
r u l e (Eq. 3) w i l l produce a n e g a t i v e l y a c c e l e r a t e d f u n c t i o n 
QCD^CDW)-
Furthermore, i f E C D , E D D > .50, E D D ( j ) < E C D (k) i m p l i e s 
QDD^DD^)) < QCD ( E C D ( k ) ) , 
f o r a l l j < n and k, where the i n d i c e s DD and CD denote the 
dimension-dependent and c r i t e r i o n - d e p e n d e n t p r o c e s s i n g 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
Evidence. S i m u l a t i o n r e s u l t s w i t h the CD- (Eq. 3), as w e l l 
as w i t h the DD-processing r u l e are shown i n F i g u r e 3. Again, n = 
11, v e [1,7]. These r e s u l t s seem t o i n d i c a t e t h a t the CD-
p r o c e s s i n g r u l e i s s u p e r i o r f o r a l l d e c i s i o n e f f o r t s exceeding 
some c r i t i c a l e f f o r t (say E = 50). 
I f u t i l i t y i s a l i n e a r f u n c t i o n o f p r o c e s s i n g e f f o r t and 
d e c i s i o n q u a l i t y , f o r a n e g a t i v e l y a c c e l e r a t e d f u n c t i o n *Q, an 
opti m a l e f f o r t - q u a l i t y t r a d e - o f f would be achi e v e d by the 
parameter k, f o r which 
Q(E(k)) - Q(M(k)) 
> 1, and 
E(k) - M(k) 
Q(m(k)) - Q(E(k)) 
< 1. 
m(k) - E(k) 
A d e c i s i o n maker, who attempts t o achieve an o p e r a t i n g 
p o i n t , which i s c l o s e t o an optimal t r a d e - o f f between the e f f o r t 
and the q u a l i t y o f a c h o i c e , must t h e r e f o r e somehow determine the 
r e s p e c t i v e k-parameters. 
The approximate d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f a c l o s e t o o p t i m a l k-
parameter over a number of d e c i s i o n s . Rather than p o s t u l a t i n g 
t h a t a d e c i s i o n maker would perform a formal d e c i s i o n a n a l y s i s 
f o r f i n d i n g the optimal k-parameters, we assume t h a t such 
parameters are s p e c i f i e d by the experience from p r e v i o u s 
d e c i s i o n s . We assume t h a t d u r i n g the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s the 
dimension number j , a t which the sum 
FIGURE 3 
j 
E v ( x ± ) - v ( y ± ) 
i = l 
changed from a p o s i t i v e t o a neg a t i v e v a l u e or v i c e v e r s a w i l l be 
remembered. We suppose t h a t t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n i s used f o r 
a d j u s t i n g the k parameter f o r the next d e c i s i o n s . One p o s s i b l e 
r u l e f o r a d j u s t i n g the k parameter, which does not r e q u i r e any 
feedback about the q u a l i t y of a c h o i c e would be: I n i t i a l v a l u e K 
= n * r , a f t e r every c h o i c e a new va l u e k* i s s p e c i f i e d . 
k* : = k + 1 i f j k - j < N-l 
k* : = k - 1 i f j k - j > N 2 
k* : = k e l s e , where N-]_ < N 2, and k* denotes the new 
k-value. By an ada p t i v e procedure of t h i s k i n d o p t i m a l k -
va l u e s c o u l d p o s s i b l y be approximated (Treisman & W i l l i a m s , 
1984) . 
The conducted a n a l y s i s shows t h a t q u i t e a s u b s t a n t i a l amount 
of p r o c e s s i n g e f f o r t can be saved by s e l e c t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n 
p r o c e s s i n g without s e v e r e l y a f f e c t i n g c h o i c e q u a l i t y . A number 
of e m p i r i c a l r e s u l t s show t h a t human d e c i s i o n makers apply 
d e c i s i o n r u l e s o f the s o r t .described by the CD-processing r u l e 
(Aschenbrenner e t a l . 1984; Busemeyer, 1985; Schmalhofer e t a l . , 
1986; Schmalhofer & Schafer, 1986; Schmalhofer e t a l . , 1987). 
IMPLEMENTING PRESCRIPTIVE RULES WITH DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS 
One p o s s i b l e reason why humans and human experts do not 
conform t o p r e s c r i p t i v e r u l e s may thus be t h a t p r e s c r i p t i v e r u l e s 
demand too much p r o c e s s i n g e f f o r t w i t h r e s p e c t t o improvements i n 
ch o i c e q u a l i t y . S i n c e the p r o c e s s i n g which humans are not 
w i l l i n g t o do c o u l d be performed by a computer the q u a l i t y of 
human d e c i s i o n s c o u l d be improved by having a computer process 
a l l t he i n f o r m a t i o n which i s n e g l e c t e d by human d e c i s i o n makers. 
D e c i s i o n support systems such as MAUD (Humphreys & McFadden, 
1980) may enhance human d e c i s i o n s i n t h i s way. MAUD allows i t s 
u s e r t o e n t e r any a l t e r n a t i v e as w e l l as an a r b i t r a r y number of 
a l t e r n a t i v e s f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n t o the d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s . These 
a l t e r n a t i v e s may be c h a r a c t e r i z e d by whichever a t t r i b u t e s a user 
c o n s i d e r s t o be r e l e v a n t . A f t e r s p e c i f y i n g the ( u t i l i t y ) v a l u e s 
o f the d i f f e r e n t a l t e r n a t i v e s on the v a r i o u s a t t r i b u t e s as w e l l 
as importance weights f o r the a t t r i b u t e s , a use r i s a s s i s t e d by 
MAUD i n making a d e c i s i o n a c c o r d i n g t o the MAU p r i n c i p l e . 
Thereby, a number of r a t i o n a l i t y c r i t e r i a such as c o n s i s t e n c y and 
t r a n s i t i v i t y of preferences w i l l be s a t i s f i e d . 
Thus MAUD compensates f o r drawbacks which a r i s e from 
s e l e c t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g of humans, by performing a 
number o f analyses which u s u a l l y are too demanding f o r the human 
i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s o r . In summary i t can thus be concluded, t h a t 
d e c i s i o n support systems such as MAUD allow the human d e c i s i o n 
maker t o d e r i v e a choi c e according t o some p r e s c r i p t i v e r u l e by 
t a k i n g the burden of the a c t u a l c a l c u l a t i o n s away from the user. 
D e c i s i o n support systems l i k e MAUD thus d e r i v e d e c i s i o n s 
a c c o r d i n g t o p r e s c r i p t i v e r a t h e r than d e s c r i p t i v e models. 
P r e s c r i p t i v e models r a t h e r than human in f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are thus taken as the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e of such 
d e c i s i o n support systems. 
A c c o r d i n g t o t h i s approach as w e l l as according t o the very 
simple expert system d i s c u s s e d by Mumpower (1987), humans are 
prov i d e d w i t h a s s i s t a n c e , so t h a t they would adhere t o c e r t a i n — 
sometimes q u i t e general — r a t i o n a l i t y p r i n c i p l e s . 
ANALYZING EXPERTS FOR DEVELOPING BETTER DECISION PROCEDURES 
As Hammond (1987) has poi n t e d out, the f i e l d of a r t i f i c i a l 
i n t e l l i g e n c e (Al) takes q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t approach. Despite the 
r e a l o r seeming inadequacies of human expert d e c i s i o n s A l 
re s e a r c h e r s assume t h a t expert systems are best designed by 
stu d y i n g how human experts f u n c t i o n . Rather than reducing a 
d e c i s i o n problem t o some s p e c i f i c a t i o n with a small number of 
v a r i a b l e s , which can consequently be handled by some p r e s c r i p t i v e 
r u l e , A l r e s e a r c h e r s assume d e c i s i o n s t o be made on the ground of 
a l a r g e knowledge base. 
T h e r e f o r e , the ques t i o n i s whether the normative r u l e s which 
have been s t u d i e d i n the judgment and d e c i s i o n l i t e r a t u r e should 
be used as "best procedure" or whether the i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g 
of human experts should be taken as g u i d e l i n e f o r developing 
expert d e c i s i o n systems. The r e l a t i o n between the JDM-approach 
and the Al-approach i s shown i n Fi g u r e 4. 
JDM-research c o n s i d e r s p r e s c r i p t i v e r u l e s from which they 
have found human behavior t o d e v i a t e t o be the best d e c i s i o n 
procedure. A l - r e s e a r c h e r s , on the other hand, analyze the 
behavior o f human experts t o develop expert systems, which they 
may then c o n s i d e r t o be the best procedure. As Hammond has 
po i n t e d out and as Fi g u r e 4 shows, the views of A l and JDM 
re s e a r c h e r s d i s a g r e e with one another. 
FIGURE ^ 
o p t i m a l d e c i s i o n procedure 
human e x p e r t d e c i s i o n s 




Some doubts may be r a i s e d whether p r e s c r i p t i v e r u l e s r e a l l y 
are the b e s t d e c i s i o n procedure: 
1. As the paper of M i l t o n (1987) has again demonstrated, 
d e c i s i o n analyses which are based on p r e s c r i p t i v e r u l e s are only 
m a r g i n a l l y s u c c e s s f u l or not s u c c e s s f u l at a l l i n r e a l d e c i s i o n 
domains. 
2. P r e s c r i p t i v e r u l e s do not agree with the d e c i s i o n r u l e s 
of e x p e r t s . 
3. But, experts are r a t h e r s u c c e s s f u l i n t h a t they are 
respected as such and are p a i d a c c o r d i n g l y f o r t h e i r job 
(Shanteau, 1987) 
Contrary t o the c o n c l u s i o n s of Hammond, i t may thus appear 
t h a t the p r e s c r i p t i v e r u l e s analyzed by JDM-researchers are only 
optimal w i t h r e s p e c t t o the a r t i f i c i a l circumstances, which, 
however, do not e x i s t i n r e a l l i f e d e c i s i o n problems. 
I t may be suspected t h a t some d e c i s i o n b i a s e s as w e l l as 
other non-optimal behaviors of experts may have a f u n c t i o n a l 
value i n n a t u r a l environments. In order t o r e v e a l such 
f u n c t i o n a l v a l u e s , we w i l l c o n s i d e r two of the most prominent 
v i o l a t i o n s of p r e s c r i p t i v e r u l e s . On the one hand, d e c i s i o n 
makers are known t o ignore r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n , and on the other 
hand, i t i s a l s o known t h a t i r r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n a f f e c t s 
d e c i s i o n s . What are p o s s i b l e f u n c t i o n s of t h i s seemingly non-
optimal behavior. I t has already been p o i n t e d out t h a t s e l e c t i v e 
i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g may reduce p r o c e s s i n g e f f o r t by a great 
d e a l without d e t e r i o r a t i n g choice q u a l i t y . In a d d i t i o n , 
s e l e c t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s i n g w i l l y i e l d a simpler 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a choice than an a l l encompassing d e c i s i o n . A 
d e c i s i o n i s thus e a s i e r to communicate. 
On the other hand, i r r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n may be processed 
i n order t o a d j u s t t o changes i n the f u t u r e . For example, 
c o n s i d e r a p h y s i c i a n who has t o decide which p a t i e n t should be 
given an organ f o r t r a n s p l a n t a t i o n . Furthermore assume t h a t the 
p a r t i c u l a r type of organ t r a n s p l a n t a t i o n would s t i l l be i n an 
experimental phase. Under these c o n d i t i o n s , t r a n s p l a n t a t i o n of 
an organ may onl y be considered as an u l t i m a r a t i o . C r i t e r i a 
such as age and p r o j e c t e d l i f e expectancy would thus be 
cons i d e r e d i r r e l e v a n t because an organ t r a n s p l a n t a t i o n should 
only be performed i f the p a t i e n t would d i e otherwise. 
As the medical s k i l l s are f u r t h e r developed, however, organ 
t r a n s p l a n t a t i o n s should be performed e a r l i e r when the r e s p e c t i v e 
p a t i e n t i s s t i l l h ealthy, thereby improving the success r a t e . 
C r i t e r i a which have been considered i r r e l e v a n t may now become 
r e l e v a n t . An expert who processes i r r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n may 
thus j u s t be p r o c e s s i n g i n f o r m a t i o n which w i l l be considered 
r e l e v a n t i n the f u t u r e . Again such a c h o i c e can be j u s t i f i e d 
more e a s i l y i n the f u t u r e , when everybody uses the new c r i t e r i a . 
The example may demonstrate t h a t the p r e s c r i p t i v e r u l e s are 
much too simple and too s t a t i c t o capture a l l the c o m p l e x i t i e s of 
expert d e c i s i o n s : 
Rather than s e l e c t i n g the a l t e r n a t i v e , which maximizes the 
( s u b j e c t i v e ) u t i l i t y , e xpert d e c i s i o n s should agree w i t h the 
l a r g e body of expert o p i n i o n s . In a d d i t i o n i t must be p o s s i b l e 
t o e x p l a i n a d e c i s i o n i n terms of the expert knowledge r a t h e r 
than q u o t i n g some p r e s c r i p t i v e r u l e . An expert must a l s o be 
capable of j u s t i f y i n g a d e c i s i o n f o r the many d i f f e r e n t 
v i e w p o i n t s which people may use f o r i n t e r r o g a t i n g h i s d e c i s i o n . 
Consequently, expert d e c i s i o n s must be knowledge-based and cannot 
be reduced t o the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of v a l u e s . 
U n l i k e human d e c i s i o n makers, p r e s c r i p t i v e r u l e s do not 
p r o v i d e such adaptiveness and f l e x i b i l i t y . T h e r e f o r e , human 
d e c i s i o n s cannot be r e p l a c e d by some p r e s c r i p t i v e r u l e . Quite to 
the c o n t r a r y , i n order t o a s s i s t human d e c i s i o n making, i t seems 
a d v i s a b l e t o emulate the dynamic d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s of experts i n 
computer systems. The b e s t d e c i s i o n procedure should thus not 
only produce the same d e c i s i o n s as the human expert, but should 
d e r i v e the d e c i s i o n i n the same way. In ot h e r words, an expert 
system should be a c o g n i t i v e model (Schmalhofer & Wetter, 1987) 
of the human expert, so t h a t the system i s a d j u s t e d t o the human 
user r a t h e r than the human user b e i n g r e q u i r e d t o adapt t o an 
a r b i t r a r y a r t i f i c i a l system. By a d j u s t i n g the i n f o r m a t i o n 
p r o c e s s i n g of expert systems t o the a c t u a l c o g n i t i v e processes of 
humans, expert systems can be employed as a c o g n i t i v e t o o l , which 
a s s i s t s the human r a t h e r than r e p l a c i n g h i s competence by some 
" p r e s c r i p t i v e model." 
Expert systems which are designed as c o g n i t i v e t o o l s f o r a 
human u s e r should r e c e i v e a much h i g h e r a c c e p t a b i l i t y than the so 
c a l l e d p r e s c r i p t i v e systems. I f an expert system processes 
i n f o r m a t i o n s i m i l a r t o a human, a human user w i l l be b e t t e r able 
t o understand, accept, and a l s o j u s t i f y the d e c i s i o n s which are 
d e r i v e d w i t h the a s s i s t a n c e of the system. 
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